This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents in diverse technology fields such that it becomes impractical to develop a new product that with certainty does not inadvertently infringe on other firms' patent portfolios. We investigate how litigation incentives for the holders of patent portfolios impact the incentives to introduce new products and draw welfare implications. We also consider a patent portfolio acquisition game in which a third party's patent portfolio is up for sale.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of patent applications and patents granted as a result of …rms amassing vast patent portfolios, leading to "patent portfolio races." This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which …rms accumulate a large amount of related patents in diverse technology …elds to mitigate potential "holdup" problems and use them as bargaining chips in negotiations with other patent owners.
We analyze how the relative position of patent portfolios vis-à-vis competitors in ‡uences incentives to litigate and how they in turn impact incentives to develop a new product.
We consider a situation in which the sheer number of patents held by other …rms makes it impractical for …rms to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement on other …rms' patent portfolio with certainty. For instance, Cotropia and Lemley (2009) report that only a very small fraction of patent infringement cases involve defendants who have copied the patented technology, implying that most cases entail inadvertent infringement.
Bessen and Meurer (2006) also provide empirical evidence suggesting that most defendants in patent litigation are inadvertent infringers rather than …rms attempting to copy or invent around patents. This type of situation is particularly pertinent in many high-tech industries where technologies are rapidly advancing and draw upon existing stocks of knowledge.
The convergence of digital media and the emergence of the Internet have also blurred the boundaries of the previously separate information and communication technology (ICT) industries. As a result, the development of new products in the ICT industry often requires access to and integration of numerous complementary technologies, as illustrated by smartphones that employ a variety of technologies in the areas of wireless communication, GPS, camera, digital technology, high speed broadband, and so on. The semiconductor industry provides another example of an industry that "requires access to a 'thicket' of intellectual property rights in order to advance the technology or to legally produce or sell" new products (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 ). Ericsson and Sony) is a case in point. When Nortel went bankrupt and its patent portfolio of approximately 6,000 patents was auctioned o¤ as part of the bankruptcy proceeding, the Rockstar consortium acquired it with a $4.5 billion bid. Google, which lost its bid for Nortel patents, responded with its own acquisition of Motorola Mobility at the price of $12.5 billion. The transaction involved Motorola Mobility's entire asset portfolio, including its handset businesses, but Google's primary interest was known to be Motorola's more than 17 ,000 patents in wireless technologies (Rusli and Miller, 2011) .
As …rms expand their patent portfolios, perhaps as a response to potential hold-up by other …rms' patent portfolios, the amassment of patents inevitably leads to overlapping claims and litigations. In conjunction with the build-up of its patent portfolios, Apple was embroiled in more than 150 IP lawsuits in 2012 as a plainti¤, defendant, and counterclaimant, with the highest pro…le lawsuit being the global litigation with Samsung, which resulted in the jury awarding Apple with $1.05 billion in damage in the US (New York Times, August 24, 1982) . 1 The recent explosion of patent-related litigation and strategic patent portfolio acquisitions demand a new paradigm of patent analysis that shifts away from isolated patents and towards patent portfolios.
We develop a model to analyze how the accumulation of patent portfolios a¤ects litigation incentives and how this feeds into incentives to develop new products. In particular, we analyze the e¤ect of relative positions on litigation incentives and settlement terms, and compare litigation incentives of practicing entities (hereafter, PE) vis-à-vis non-practicing entities (NPE). The conventional wisdom is that NPEs have higher incentives to litigate because they do not have any product that would be subject to counter litigation. We show that this is true in most circumstances, but PEs may have higher incentives when product market competition is intense. The intuition is that litigation provides a mechanism to change each …rm's market position from a duopolist to a stochastic monopolist. The bene…t of this change becomes more important as the pro…t in a duopolistic market decreases with the intensity of competition.
Based on the analysis of litigation incentives, we further investigate the e¤ects of patent portfolios on the incentives to develop a new product in the shadow of ex post patent litigation. We show that as one …rm accumulates, it is necessary that at least one …rm's investment in new product development decreases. A typical scenario would be the accumulating …rm increases its investment while the rival …rm decreases. However, it is possible that the accumulating …rm decreases its development e¤orts and opts to operate as an NPE if the rival …rm already has a strong patent portfolio position and is more likely to develop a new product. Another possibility is that both …rms reduce investment in new products, but both …rms investing more is not possible as one …rm accumulates more patents.
In light of recent high pro…le patent portfolio sales, we also explore a patent portfolio acquisition game. We consider two scenarios. When the competition is between PEs, we show that the …rm with the larger portfolio acquires the additional portfolio in equilibrium while consumers would be better o¤ if the portfolio were acquired by the …rm with the weaker portfolio. When the competition is between a PE and an NPE, the only incentive for the PE to acquire the patent portfolio is for defensive purposes while the incentive for an NPE is to extract licensing fees from the PE. In this case, the willingness to pay for the patent portfolio is the same for both …rms. The equilibrium price will be at the point where both …rms are indi¤erent between acquiring and not acquiring. Either way, the PE pays a price. In our benchmark model, an NPE arises as a …rm fails to develop a new product.
Additionally, we also investigate NPE as a business model in which …rms acquire patent portfolios without any intention to produce any products: their business model is to litigate (or threat to litigate) and extract licensing revenues from PEs.
Despite the importance of patent portfolios in the innovation market and much discussion in popular press, academic papers on this topic are sparse. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) conduct an empirical analysis of patenting behavior in the U.S. semiconductor industry between 1979 and 1995 to rationalize the so-called "patent paradox,"a recent phenomenon of an unprecedented surge in patenting unaccounted for by increases in R&D spending alone even as the expected value of each patent decreases (Kortum and Lerner, 1998) . They ex-plore the link between the pro-patent policy shift via the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982 and intensi…ed patenting behavior by analyzing the patent data in the semiconductor industry complemented by interviews with industry representatives. They …nd that large-scale manufacturers have invested far more aggressively in patents with the pro-patent policy shift, engaging in patent portfolio races aimed at reducing concerns about being held up by external patent owners and at negotiating access to external technologies on more favorable terms. Ziedonis (2004) expands on Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and …nds that …rms patent more aggressively than otherwise expected when markets for technology are highly fragmented and ownership rights are widely dispersed.
Thus, an aggressive patent portfolio acquisition strategy is an organizational response to mitigate hazards in markets for technology when ex ante solutions are infeasible due to fragmentation and heightened transactions costs.
Morton and Shapiro (2013) provide a related and complementary analysis to our paper.
More speci…cally, they conduct an analysis of the tactics used by NPEs to monetize the patents they acquire. They analyze the e¤ects of enhanced patent monetization on innovation and on consumers and how they change depending on the type of seller, the type of buyer and the patent portfolio involved. Our model deals with a broader set of issues including litigation incentives of both PEs and NPEs and an explicit analysis of patent acquisition games.
Bessen and Meurer (2006) develop a model of patent litigation similar to ours. They consider a game in which a patent owner invests in a level of patent protection that in‡uences the probability of successfully suing a potential entrant and the strength of this probability is known once two …rms invest in product developments. Their main purpose is to derive testable empirical predictions based on reduced form pro…t functions. Our framework provides a microfoundation by explicitly considering a litigation game to analyze the incentives to litigate and the terms of settlement. Our model also allows for an analysis of a patent acquisition game, welfare e¤ects of strategic patent portfolios, and other related issues without resorting to any ad hoc assumptions.
Chiou (2013) touches upon similar issues addressed in this paper, but in a very di¤erent framework. He builds a model with a continuum of …rms, all of whom can acquire a patent.
In terms of manufacturing capability, there are two types of …rms. One type of …rm has no manufacturing capacity and only serves as a non-practicing entity. The other type of …rm can invest in manufacturing facilities. As in our model, a patent can be used as a defensive mechanism to be used as a credible countersuit to threats or as a purely o¤ensive one. Depending on their patenting and investment costs, …rms self-select into NPE, pure manufacturing …rm (without a patent), or a vertically integrated …rm (that has a patent and manufactures). He analyzes how the industry con…guration depends on what he calls the "defensive premium." In such a framework, he shows that an (exogenous) increase in the defensive premium induces more investment by PEs but can have the side e¤ect of increasing incentives for o¤ensive patenting by NPEs. His model, however, is devoid of strategic interactions due to the continuum assumption and thus is incapable of analyzing the e¤ects of industry competitiveness on strategic incentives to litigate and on investment incentives. 2 Law scholars have also waded in the debate. In an attempt to provide a resolution to the patent paradox, Parchomovsky & Wagner (2004) develop a patent portfolio theory that "the true value of patents lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents." They posit that the amassment of patent portfolios generates "scale"and "diversity"that would confer advantages over individual patents. Scale allows the freedom to innovate, avoiding costly litigation, improving bargaining position, and facilitating capital investments, whereas diversity allows …rms to hedge against the uncertainties regarding a product, future market conditions, future competitors, and possible changes in patent law. In short, well-crafted patent portfolios act as a "super-patent"and as a result, "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts"as a patent acquisition strategy. However, they do not formalize the mechanisms by which such advantages arise. In addition, their analysis is focused on explaining the incentives to build patent portfolios while our analysis concerns how patent portfolios a¤ect litigation incentives and new product development.
Chien (2010) explores implications of "patent-assertion entities,"sometimes derisively called "patent trolls," in the patent ecosystem. The sole purpose of patent-assertion entities is to use patents primarily to obtain license fees rather than to support the development of technology, which creates a secondary market for patents that would otherwise sit on the shelf. She proposes a framework that includes both the "arms race,"in which the goal is to provide entities with the freedom to operate, and the marketplace, through which entities leverage their freedom to litigate. She argues that the value of a patent can be based on the "exclusion value" rather than the "intrinsic value" when it is held by patent-assertion entities. Our paper formalizes how the exclusion value is created by the credible threat to litigate and explores the implications on incentives to develop new products.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we set up a very simple model of patent portfolios and investigate litigation incentives. Section 3 analyzes how the relative strength of patent portfolios a¤ects the incentives to introduce a new product. In Section 4, we analyze welfare implications for consumers of strategic patent portfolios. Section 5 considers a patent portfolio acquisition game in which a third party's patent portfolio is up for sale. Section 6 considers NPE as a business model. Section 7 extends the analysis and checks the robustness of the main results. Section 8 closes the paper with concluding remarks. The proofs for lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
We consider two …rms competing to introduce a new product into a market. Each …rm i has a patent portfolio of size S i , where i = 1; 2: When …rm i develops a new product, there is a chance that its new product may infringe on some of the patents in the other …rm's patent portfolio, which is an increasing function of the other …rm's patent portfolio size S j , j 6 = i. Let us denote these infringing probabilities by j , which can be interpreted as the strength of …rm j's patent portfolio. 3 The new product contains many new features and functionalities, such as smartphones do. By this formulation, we envision a situation in which "the high cost of evaluating which patents in the rival …rm's portfolio of thousands might apply" to each functionality makes it impractical to avoid infringement on other …rm's patents with certainty. 4 We assume that the values of j are common knowledge to both …rms.
Firms can invest resources into developing new products. We assume that when a …rm invests I, the probability of successful introduction of a new product is given by p(I), 3 More generally, the probability of infringing …rm j's patent portfolio, j ; will depend not only on …rm j 0 s patent portfolio size, but also the patent quality. 4 Chien (2010), p. 308.
where p 0 (I) > 0, p 00 (I) < 0; and 0 < p(I) < 1, for any positive I. More generally, we could assume that the probability of success depends on the size and quality of each …rm's patent portfolio. By assuming that the probability of success does not depend on the existing patent portfolio, we essentially consider only patent portfolios of non-core technologies whose value derives from their exclusion value rather than intrinsic value and their impact on successful product design is of second order importance. Alternatively, we can interpret investment I as marketing e¤orts. In the introduction of feature-laden high-tech products, success is di¢ cult to assess because how the key features of the new product will appeal to consumers is hard to predict in advance.
Depending on the outcomes of each …rm's product introduction, there are several subgames to consider. If both …rms fail to introduce a new product, the game ends and there is nothing further to analyze. There are two meaningful cases: one in which only one …rm is successful and the other in which both …rms are successful.
Litigation and Settlement with PE and NPE
Suppose only …rm i is successful in introducing a new product. Thus, …rm i is the only practicing entity (PE) and the other …rm j(6 = i) is a non-practicing entity (NPE). The monopoly pro…t associated with the new product is denoted by m . In this case, …rm j has an option to litigate, claiming that successful …rm i's new product infringes on its patent portfolio. With probability j the litigating …rm will prevail in court. In such a case the court grants an injunction and …rms engage in Nash bargaining. With equal bargaining power, the innovating …rm has to pay a licensing fee of m =2 to the NPE. Let L be the litigation costs for both …rms. Thus, …rm j will litigate if the following condition holds:
This implies that …rm j as a non-practicing entity (NPE) will have a credible threat to litigate the innovating …rm if j = 2L= m : However, in order to save on litigation costs, the two …rms always …nd it pro…table to settle out of court. In ex ante settlement negotiations with equal bargaining powers, the PE agrees to pay j m =2 to the NPE, anticipating court outcomes and subsequent bargaining on ex post licensing fees. Let XY i denote …rm i 0 s expected payo¤s when …rm i is in state X and the rival …rm j(6 = i) is in state Y where states 1 and 0; respectively, represent a successful introduction of a new product and a failure. Each …rm's expected payo¤s when only one …rm is successful can be written as:
In other words, for a patent portfolio to have an impact, it needs to achieve a certain level of critical mass to make its litgation threat credible. Note that at the threshold value at which the litigation threat becomes credible (i.e., at j = ), both pro…t functions are discontinuous. The pro…ts of the PE decrease by L(= m =2) whereas the pro…ts of the NPE increase by the same amount.
Litigation and Settlement with two PEs
Now consider a scenario in which both …rms successfully launch new products. Let the duopoly pro…t be denoted by d , where 2 d m : 5 We consider …rms'incentives to litigate or to settle. When …rm i …les a claim against …rm j; we assume that …rm j's optimal strategy is to counter-litigate as is typically the case in the real world. This implies that …rm i risks its own product being subject to injunction as a practicing entity (PE) when it initiates litigation. There are several potential outcomes in the presence of litigation. One possibility is that neither …rm is found to infringe on the other's patent portfolio. This leads to a duopoly outcome and takes place with probability (1 1 )(1 2 ): Another outcome that leads to a status quo is when both …rms are found to infringe on the other's patent portfolio. In such a case, we assume that they cross-license each other and maintain a duopoly outcome. The remaining possibility is that one …rm, say …rm i, is found not to infringe on …rm j's while …rm j is found to infringe on …rm i's patent portfolio. With the assumption of 2 d m , there is no possibility of settlement and …rm i will be a monopolist in the market. Thus, …rm i will litigate if it holds that
Litigation provides …rm i with the opportunity to monopolize the market in the case where its rival is found infringing while itself is not. However, this bene…t has to be weighed against the cost of litigation and the potential loss of duopoly pro…ts in the case of the reverse litigation outcome. Solving (2) for the respective …rm's own portfolio strength yields that …rm i has an incentive to litigate if i i ( j ); where
Given the rival's patent portfolio strength, a …rm needs to acquire a su¢ cient level of its own patent portfolio strength to make its litigation threat credible. In addition, it can be easily veri…ed that i ( j ) is an increasing function of j : This means that as the rival's patent portfolio increases, a …rm has lower incentives to litigate. This captures the idea that building a patent portfolio can be used as a defensive mechanism against potential litigation. Notice that this defensive mechanism works only against PEs, but not NPEs, because the incentive to litigate for NPEs depends only on its own patent portfolio strength,
To further analyze the litigation incentives of PEs, let us de…ne the litigation set for each …rm as
Then, a litigation threat by at least one …rm is credible if
Otherwise, there will be no litigation. However, litigation does not always takes place when
Firms can negotiate an out-of-court settlement to avoid the cost of litigation before bringing an infringement suit. A settlement occurs and litigation is avoided if the …rms'joint pro…ts from a duopoly outcome are higher than the joint expected pro…ts from litigation, that is, if the following condition holds:
Let S be the set of ( 1 ; 2 ) for which the above condition holds. Litigation takes place if and only if
By comparing the condition that de…nes each set, it can be easily veri…ed that when both …rms have unilateral incentives to litigate, a settlement is not possible. To see this,
note that litigation occurs if the sum of LHS of condition (2) for both …rms is greater or equal than the sum of the RHS of (2) for both …rms, that is, if
Let S ( 2 ) denote the value of 1 such that this condition holds with equality. Condition (3) is satis…ed when (2) holds and both …rms have an incentive to litigate. However, when only one …rm, say only …rm i, has an incentive to litigate, i.e.,
This leads us to the following lemma.
= ; where i = 1; 2; and j 6 = i:
The lemma says that we can always …nd a set of parameters ( write each …rm's expected pro…t when both …rms are PEs as follows:
The second case, (iii) For higher litigation costs, …rms never litigate. (iv) Overall, the more intense the product market competition, the more litigation in the industry.
The litigation and settlement equilibrium is summarized in Figure 1 and 2 below. (3)). Hence, we would expect to see more litigation among PEs in industries where product market competition is more intense. To be more precise, consider …rms with patent portfolios of equal size 1 = 2 = and compare the litigation incentive constraints (1) and (3). Figure 3 depicts the two con-
Comparison of Litigation Incentives between NPE and PE
NPEs have an incentive to litigate when their portfolio is su¢ ciently strong (i.e., ): The incentive to litigate for PEs is maximized when the probability that exactly one …rm is found infringing, 2 (1 a) is highest, i.e., at = 1=2. 
Investment in New Product Development
One of the major concerns about the patent thicket and the accumulation of strategic patent portfolios is their impact on innovative activities. In this section we analyze the e¤ects of patent portfolios on the incentives to invest in R&D. For given patent portfolio sizes ( 1 ; 2 ), …rm i's expected payo¤ when it invests I i and the rival …rm invests I j can be written as
Firm i's optimal investment level on new product development, given I j ; can be derived by solving the following problem:
M ax
The …rst order condition for …rm i's optimal investment, @ i =@I i = 0, can be rewritten as
This equation implicitly de…nes …rm i's reaction function I i = R i (I j ; 1 ; 2 ). The LHS is the expected bene…t of investing in a higher R&D success rate. The rival is successful with probability p(I j ). In this case, a higher success rate for …rm i makes it more likely that both …rms introduce new products and less likely that …rm i is an NPE facing a successful rival.
By contrast, when the rival is not successful, more investment leads to a higher probability that …rm i is the only PE in the industry. Hence, higher pro…ts as a PE increase the incentive to invest whereas higher pro…ts as an NPE, 01 i ( i ), lower R&D incentives. The Nash equilibrium investment levels I 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) and I 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) are at the intersection of the …rms' reaction functions. We now conduct a comparative static analysis of how changes in ( 1 ; 2 ) a¤ect the equilibrium investment in product development (I 1 ; I 2 ):
Throughout this analysis we assume that the stability condition (see the appendix to the next proposition) is satis…ed and we focus on situations where the unique Nash equilibium is an interior solution. As a …rst step, compare the pro…t functions of PEs and NPEs.
The relative magnitudes of 11 i ( 1 ; 2 ) and 01 i ( i ), however, are ambiguous and depend on the competitiveness of the duopoly outcome.
The lemma states that for any con…guration of patent portfolio positions, a …rm strictly prefers to be the sole …rm that succeeds in product development. However, when the other …rm is successful in the development of a new product, it is not necessarily better to develop its own product and compete in the product market. It may be better to be an NPE, especially when competition is intense and the other …rm has built a strong position in its patent portfolio that can be used against the …rm in consideration. Lemma 3 directly implies the following property.
Lemma 4 Investments in new product development are strategic substitutes.
We are now in a position to analyze the e¤ect of a unilateral increase in one …rm's patent portfolio position on investment.
Lemma 5 @R i =@ j < 0, but the sign of @R i =@ i is ambiguous. In particular, (i) if …rm i has incentives to litigate only when it is a PE, @R i =@ i > 0; (ii) if …rm i has incentives to litigate only when it is an NPE, then @R i =@ i < 0; and (iii) if …rm i has incentives to litigate whenever …rm j develops a new product and j < 1=2, then @R i =@ i > 0:
Lemma 5 states that when …rm i's patent portfolio size increases, the rival …rm j's reaction function in investment of new product development shifts inwards. However, the e¤ect on its own product development is ambiguous. When …rm i's litigation threat is credible for …rm i whenever …rm j develops a new product, an increase in …rm i's patent portfolio induces its own reaction function to shift out only when j < 1=2; that is, the rival …rm's patent portfolio size is not substantial.
Proposition 2
When @R i =@ i > 0; …rm i's reaction function shifts out as it accumulates more patents in its portfolio while the rival …rm's reaction function shift in. As a result, …rm i increases its investment in new product development whereas the rival …rm responds by investing less. When @R i =@ i < 0; both …rms' reaction function shifts in. In this case, the most likely outcome is that both …rms reduce investments as one …rm builds a stronger patent portfolio. However, it is possible that one of them increases its investments if the other …rm's reaction curve shifts relatively more. Yet, it is never possible that both …rms increase their investment as a result of patent accumulation by one …rm.
Welfare e¤ects of strategic patent portfolios
Firms accumulate patent portfolios as a strategic response to potential litigation due to inadvertent patent infringement. While it is impossible to prevent the formation of such portfolios, we can consider their welfare e¤ects in conjunction with the underlying de…cien-cies of the patent system. In other words, would consumer welfare increase in a world where patents are ironclad and well-de…ned while …rms are perfectly informed and able to invent around their rival's patents?
In this section we address this issue by comparing two scenarios. The …rst scenario is the set-up from the previous section. Patent validity and scope are uncertain and …rms hold incomplete information about the patent positions of their rivals. In this case, patent portfolios increase the risk of inadvertent infringement and ex post litigation. We dub this the "patent uncertainty" scenario. In the second scenario, patents are ironclad and …rms have ex ante complete information. That is, …rms are aware of all possible infringments and are able to invent around their rival's patents. This is the "complete information" or "patent certainty" scenario. We compare ex ante consumer surplus in these two scenario.
First, we derive investment levels in the patent certainty scenario and compare with the previous section. Then, we investigate overall ex ante expected consumer surplus.
Consider investment incentives in the patent certainty scenario. In the absence of inadvertent infringement and litigation, …rm i's optimal investment, for a given rival investment
Compare this condition with the …rst-order condition (4) in the previous section. A su¢ cient condition for both …rms to invest more with patent uncertainty is that each …rm's respective LHS in (4) is larger than the LHS of (5). 6 The …rst term in each condition is the marginal value of investing given the rival innovates. The value in (4), 11 i ( i ; j ) 01 i ( i ), can be larger than d when the two innovating …rms litigate against each other in equilibrium, that is for
The second term is the marginal investment value given the rival is not active. In this case, the marginal value from investing is (at least weakly) larger in the complete information scenario.
This implies that a necessary condition for …rms investing more with patent uncertainty is that …rms litigate in the event that both introduce new products. For instance, consider a situation in which NPEs do not have an incentive to litigate while PEs litigate. 7 From Lemma 2 it follows that such situations arise when product market competition is intense and patent portfolios are neither too small nor too large. In those cases, we have 10
i ( i ) = 0 and, by (2), it holds that 11 i ( i ; j ) d : Hence, the LHS of (4) is strictly larger than the LHS of (5) and both …rms invest strictly more under patent uncertainty.
Lemma 6 Suppose ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 e L and ex post litigation arises when both …rms innovate.
There always exist parameter values such that …rms invest more with strategic patent portfolios and patent uncertainty.
Litigation can increase industry pro…ts as it raises the probability of monopolistic market outcomes. This implies that …rms may invest more in R&D when they hold patent portfolios and there is the possibility of inadvertent infringement. In other words, strategic patent portfolios might be able to restore one of the functions of the patent system itself, that is, 
which is increasing in the success rate. Similarly, the ex ante expected consumer surplus with patent uncertainty and portfolio positions such that PEs litigate while NPE have no incentive to litigate, is
At equal success rates, the consumer surplus is lower in the presence of patent uncertainty due to the fact that when both …rms innovate and litigation ensues, there is a probability that one …rm is able to exclude its rival from the marketplace. This is the static ine¢ ciency of patent portfolios. By contrast, overall ex ante consumer surplus with patent uncertainty is higher if
where I and I 0 denote the equilibrium investment levels under patent patent uncertainty and patent certainty, respectively, with I > I 0 . This condition holds if the increase in consumer surplus due to more innovations outweighs the price e¤ect of exclusionary litigation outcomes. Condition (6), for instance, is satis…ed in the following example. We thus derive the following result.
Proposition 3
In the presence of patent uncertainty, patent portfolios have two e¤ ects on consumer surplus. There is a negative, static e¤ ect as litigation can reduce competition in the marketplace. There is also a dynamic e¤ ect as the prospect of litigation might increase or decrease investment incentives. The latter e¤ ect can dominate -and consumer surplus can be higher under patent uncertainty -for patent portfolio positions such that litigation arises when both …rms introduce new products.
Patent Portfolio Acquisition
Suppose that a patent portfolio of strength > 0 has been put up for sale. The probability that any new product infringes on some patents in the portfolio for sale is given by :
Let us assume that the sale is via an ascending price auction. When this portfolio is acquired, the acquiring …rm's patent portfolio size and its strength increases. Let 
Patent Portfolio Acquisition Game between Two PEs
Consider two PEs with existing patent portfolios of size 1 and 2 ( 1 ), respectively, bidding for the available patent packet. Firm i's willingness-to-pay is the di¤erence in pro…ts from securing the patent portfolio itself and having its rival acquire it, that is,
It is easy to verify that the …rm with the stronger existing patent portfolio, that is …rm 2, has a higher willingness-to-pay for the patents if industry pro…ts are higher when …rm 2 buys relative to the case when …rm 1 buys, or
where
The following lemma states that this condition always holds.
Lemma 7
The …rm with the larger patent portfolio has a (weakly) higher willingness-to-pay for additional patents.
The …rm with the larger patent portfolio has a stronger incentive to accumulate more patents. This is due to the fact that industry pro…ts are higher the more asymmetric the patent portfolio distribution. Asymmetric patent portfolios increase the probability that exactly one …rm can a¢ rm its patents in litigation and exclude its rival from the marketplace. Lemma 7 thus implies that, in equilibrium, …rm 2's bid is slightly higher than the willingness-to-pay of …rm 1 and …rm 2 secures the patent packet. Hence, the di¤erence in patent portfolio strength between the two …rms increases. 
0 otherwise. Now compare expected consumer surplus when …rm 1 and …rm 2 acquire the patent packet, respectively. Suppose litigation always occurs independent of which …rm acquires the packet.
Then we get
Furthermore, if there is litigation when …rm 2 acquires but not after …rm 1's acquisition, consumer surplus is always higher in the latter case. Thus, consumers are weakly better o¤ when the …rm with the smaller portfolio acquires the patents. This leads to a more even distribution of patents and a lower probability that one …rm is excluded from the marketplace when litigation arises.
Proposition 4
In equilibrium the …rm with the larger patent portfolio acquires the additional patent packet while consumers would be better o¤ if the packet would be purchased by the …rm with the weaker portfolio. The acquisition price (weakly) decreases in the degree of product market competition between …rms.
This result might explain why Google lost in its bid for Nortel Network's patent portfolio.
At the time of the patent auction, Google was in a very weak patent position compared to its rivals. Apple, Microsoft and RIM had already amassed signi…cant patent portfolios.
Some commentators were thus surprised to see Google being outbid and foregoing the opportunity to level the playing …eld. Our result suggests that intense product market competition and the potential to exclude the rival through litigation made Nortel's patent packet more valuable to the Consortium members than to Google.
The acquisition price itself re ‡ects the pro…t di¤erence for …rm 1 between winning and losing the auction. More intense competition reduces the acquisition price because the probability of ending up in a duopoly after litigation has a positive cross derivative with respect to 1 and 2 . This implies that adding the packet for sale to the smaller portfolio of …rm 1 increases the likelihood of a duopoly outcome more than adding it to the larger portfolio of …rm 2. Hence, the higher duopoly pro…ts the larger the di¤erence between winning and losing for …rm 1, and the larger the acquisition price.
Patent Portfolio Acquisition Game between PE and NPE
By contrast, consider a patent portfolio acquisition game between one PE and one NPE.
Without any loss of generality, let …rm 1 be PE and …rm 2 be NPE. As is clear from the pro…t de…nitions in Section 2, the PE's portfolio strength does not …gure into the …rms' payo¤ functions. The only reason for the PE to acquire the available patent packet is to prevent an NPE from using it in settlement negotiations or in litigation against the PE.
Since PE and NPE always settle on license terms in equilibrium rather than litigate their disputes to completion, it is clear that the willingness-to-pay for the patent portfolio is the same for both …rms, that is,
Notice that the equilibrium acquisition price exhibits a non-monotonicity in the NPE's ex ante patent strength 2 : This is illustrated in Figure 4 below. When 2 is small and the NPE does not have any credible threat to litigate even after acquiring the patent portfolio, no …rm has an incentive to pay a positive price for the patent portfolio for sale. 8 When the acquisition makes the litigation threat credible, the value of acquisition is highest. In this case, the acquisition price does not only re ‡ect the incremental strength, but also the existing patent strength. When the existing patent portfolio is already strong enough to make the litigation threat credible, the acquisition price decreases in 2 because the incremental value is less. For instance, when 2 = 1; …rm 1's new product already infringes NPE's patent portfolio for sure, so there is no need to acquire additional patents. 
NPE as a Business Model
The analysis so far has assumed that all …rms have the ability to manufacture and market new products. A …rm becomes an NPE when its investment fails to produce a new product.
However, in recent years the number of companies whose business model is purely based on converting intellectual property into licensing revenues ("patent trolls") has sharply increased.
In this section, we analyze NPEs as a business model to accommodate this possibility. Section 5 analyzes a patent portfolio acquisition game at the litigation stage after the outcomes of new product development.
In this section, we analyze the incentive to acquire a patent portfolio for sale in anticipation of new product development. To simplify the analysis, we consider a case where …rm 1 is potentially a PE, but …rm 2 is an NPE without any manufacturing capacity whose main source of revenues is through licensing.
When …rm 2 is an NPE that does not engage in any new product development, the only thing that matters is the strength of …rm 2's patent portfolio because …rm 1 cannot litigate against …rm 2. We have to consider three cases.
Case 1: 2 . In this case, …rm 2 has incentives to litigate even if it does not acquire a new patent portfolio for sale when …rm 1 has a new product. Let us de…ne
Let I 1 ( 2 ) denote the maximizer of this objective. Note that I 1 ( 2 ) is decreasing in 2 ;
and @'( 2 )=@ 2 = p(I 1 ( 2 )) m =2 < 0 by the envelope theorem: Firm 1's incentive to acquire the additional patent packet is purely for defensive purposes to prevent the NPE from acquiring it. Firm 1's maximum willingness to pay to acquire the patents for sale is given by
The incentives for …rm 2 to acquire the additional patents come from the exclusionary value, and …rm 2's maximum willingness to pay is given by
Case 2: 2 < < + 2 : In this case, …rm 2 does not have a credible threat to litigate against …rm 1 without acquiring the patent portfolio for sale, but its threat becomes credible after acquisition. In other words, 
)
m In this case, the PE's willingness to pay for the patent packet for sale is
whereas the NPE's maximum willingness to pay is given by
Case 3:
Here, the patent portfolio for sale has no value to the PE and NPE. Comparing the willingness-to-pay B 1 and B 2 in all cases, we obtain the following outcome of the patent sale.
Proposition 5 If the patent sale occurs before the development of the new product, then the PE has a (weakly) higher willingness-to-pay and acquires the patent portfolio.
The intuition for this result is that the NPE can extract rents only when the PE develops a new product. The acquisition of additional portfolio is bene…cial ex post, but adversely a¤ects the PE's investment incentives. This adverse impact on the PE's investment incentives discourages the NPE's patent portfolio acquisition. This e¤ect is absent when the acquisition auction takes place after the development of the new product.
Our analysis also reveals the incentives for NPEs to acquire a patent portfolio in secret. This is in sharp contrast to PEs' practice. Chien (2010) makes a distinction between contrasting strategies of "patent signal"and "patent secrecy". When …rms acquire a patent portfolio to deter litigation by other PEs, they publicize their patent portfolio to send a message to competitors: "If sued, I have the ability to retaliate." 9 However, the so- 
Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we extend our analysis into two directions and check the robustness of our main results.
The Market Expansion E¤ect
So far we have assumed that the two …rms are competing in the same market. With the assumption of 2 d m ; this implies that there is no licensing between PEs when one …rm is found to infringe upon the other's patent portfolio, but the latter does not infringe upon the former's. We now consider the possibility of market expansion with licensing between PEs. To formalize this, suppose that each …rm's new product covers a market size of 1.
However, there is an overlap between the two …rms'customer base of size (1 s). In other words, for the market size of s, each …rm is a monopolist, but for the remaining area of
(1 s) they compete. Thus, the parameter s represents the market expansion e¤ect when 9 Chien (2010), p. 319.
both PEs produce compared to only one PE producing. 10 When s = 1; their markets do not overlap and the market expansion e¤ect is the largest. Our previous analysis is the special case of s = 0:
When one …rm is a PE and the other is NPE, market expansion is not possible and the previous analysis applies. Now let us consider the case of two PEs. If they do not engage in litigation, their individual payo¤s are given by s m + (1 s) d . When …rm i litigates against …rm j; again, it is …rm j's best interest to counter-litigate. With the probability of
( 1 1 
Thus, three parameter regions exist. Proposition 6 When product market competition is less intense, the market expansion e¤ ect may induce …rms to license ex post rather than to litigate.
Asymmetric Product Market Positions
In our above analysis we allow …rms to hold patent portfolios of di¤erent sizes but assume in…nity, products become perfect substitutes. We impose the following two assumptions: 12
The …rst condition states that the pro…t advantage of the low-cost …rm increases as products become closer substitutes. The second set of assumptions implies that cost asymmetry increases industry duopoly pro…ts and that this e¤ect is stronger when products are closer substitutes.
First, consider …rms'unilateral incentives to litigate. Firm i has an incentive to litigate if
Comparing the individual litigation constraints yields that the …rm with the higher marginal cost (…rm 2) has a stronger incentive to litigate if and only if
This condition always hold under assumption A.1 as the smaller …rm stands to gain more from excluding its rival. Similarly, …rms prefer litigation over settlement if
Monopoly pro…ts are decreasing and convex in cost. Hence, the sum of monopoly pro…ts in the squared bracket increases in the degree of cost asymmetry. However, under assumption A.2 cost asymmetries increase duopoly industry pro…ts more and the LHS is decreasing in the parameter . It follows that in industries with asymmetric product market positions, …rms litigate less in equilibrium.
Proposition 7
The …rm with the smaller market share has a stronger incentive to litigate.
Asymmetric product market positions reduce overall litigation incentives in the industry.
Concluding Remarks
The patent system is created as a mechanism to encourage discovery and development of new ideas and technologies. However, the current patent system has been criticized and described to be under siege due to an explosion of suspect quality, overlapping, and We showed that the incentives to litigate for practicing entities depend crucially on the competitiveness of the industry. The e¤ects of an increase in one …rm's patent portfolios unambiguously reduce the rival …rm's incentives to develop a new product. However, an increase in its own patent portfolio does not necessarily induce more incentives to develop its own new product. In such a case, the patent build-up by one …rm can unambiguously reduce the overall rate of new product developments.
Our analysis can be extended to address many other unexplored issues. For instance,
we have assumed that the extent of patent portfolios held by each …rm is common knowledge. However, there are many examples in which companies with new products and services have been held up by patent asserting entities unknownst to them. Our model can help identify circumstances under which …rms with a large patent portfolio would have incentives to exploit secrecy to their advantage. One way to achieve secrecy is to create shell companies and subsidiaries, which makes it di¢ cult to track the ownership of patents.
For instance, Intellectual Ventures has created more than 1200 shell companies (Ewing and Feldman, 2012 
When 2 is su¢ ciently small, this threshold value is strictly positive and continuous in 2 .
Thus, …rms settle if both portfolios are su¢ ciently small. For 2 > 1=2; …rms settle if
It holds that
As ( 2 ) is continuous, there must exist values such that …rms settle if both portfolios are su¢ ciently strong. This proves the …rst point in Proposition 1. Further note that
Hence, there exist values ( 1 ; 2 ) such that …rms litigate if …rm 1's portfolio is su¢ ciently strong while …rm 2's portfolio is su¢ ciently weak. Similarly, condition (10) implies that
Thus, …rms litigate if …rm 1's portfolio is su¢ ciently weak and …rm 2's portfolio is su¢ ciently strong. This proves the second statement. In order to further characterize the settlement and litigation behavior, check that
Further check that
Similarly, let 2 ( 2 ) denote the value of 1 such that (2) holds with equality for …rm i=2,
Finally note that 1 ( 2 ) 2 ( 2 ) if and only if
This condition holds for any 2 if m 2 D < 2L:
The qualitative properties of the graphs in Figure 1 and 2 in the main text and the proposition follow. Proof of Lemma 4. By totally di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (4) with respect to I 1 and I 2 ; we derive
where [SOC i ] = p 00 (I i )[p(I j ) 11 i ( i ; j ) + (1 p(I j )) 10 i ( j ) p(I j ) 01 i ( i )] < 0: The inequality follows from Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 5. By totally di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (4) with respect to I i and j ; we have
since @ 11 i ( i ; j )=@ j 0 and @ 10 i ( j )=@ j 0: Similarly, a total di¤erentiation of (4) with respect to I i and i yields
Thus, the sign of @R i =@ i equals the sign of For simplicity, consider the symmetric case when both …rms hold patent portfolios of the same size . With litigation incentives in place, it holds that m = 01 i ( ) + 10 i ( ) and we can rewrite the condition as
If the rival's investment is su¢ ciently high, the …rm's reaction function shifts outwards.
Hence, if the equilibrium investment with complete information is less than this threshold value, equilibrium investment with patent uncertainty is higher.
Proof of Lemma 7. First check the condition for the case when litigation occurs no matter who buys the patent portfolio, In this case, 11 ( 1 + 1 ; 2 ) = 2 d and condition (7) always holds. From (11) it follows that it is never possible that after …rm 1's acquisition, there is litigation while there is no litigation after …rm 2's acquisition. Finally, if there is no litigation after acquisition by any of the two …rms, the industry pro…ts equal 2 d and condition (7) is satis…ed with equality.
The lemma follows. Furthermore, by assumption A.2 the derivative of the LHS decreases further as increases and the result follows.
